Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 21
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM:
Authorship Attribution Workshop

Article 14

2013

Codifying Common Law: The Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege and the New Jersey Patient Safety
Act
Adam Blander

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Adam Blander, Codifying Common Law: The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and the New Jersey Patient Safety Act, 21 J. L. & Pol'y (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol21/iss2/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

CODIFYING COMMON LAW: THE SELFCRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE AND THE
NEW JERSEY PATIENT SAFETY ACT
Adam Blander*

INTRODUCTION
In 2004, New Jersey enacted the Patient Safety Act (“the
PSA” or “the Act”),1 requiring hospitals to engage in the
“comprehensive reporting of adverse patient events, systematic
analysis of their causes, and creation of solutions.”2 The Act
was grounded in the belief that fostering “a non-punitive culture
that focuses on improving processes rather than assigning
blame”3 was crucial in promoting disclosure and reporting. As
such, it provided that materials developed from a process of
“self-critical analysis” not be discoverable nor used as evidence
in any subsequent trial or proceeding.4
*

J.D. Candidate and Health Law and Policy Fellow, Brooklyn Law School,
2013; B.A., McGill University, 2009. I thank Professor Frederic Bloom for
his persistent critical feedback; the entire Journal staff for their patience and
dedication; my father Stuart Blander for his helpful notes; and Ross Lewin
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1
See Patient Safety Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.23–25 (West
2007 & Supp. 2012).
2
Patient Safety Reporting System, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://www.state.nj.us/health/ps/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
3
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e).
4
Id. § 26:2H-12.25(g) (rendering self-critical patient safety documents
immune from discovery and not “admissible as evidence or otherwise
disclosed in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding”).
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That certain medical investigations, evaluations, and peer
review reports5 should be privileged is not a new evidentiary
concept. At least since the early 1970s, both federal and state
courts have relied on a self-critical analysis exception to the
generally liberal rules of the American discovery system to
prevent a litigant from gaining access to his adversary’s candid
assessments of its internal practices, however relevant they
might be to that litigant’s case.6
In some respects, the PSA merely codified an already
existing, judge-made, self-critical analysis privilege, which
protected medical peer review documents. In fact, the statute
text explicitly adopted the holding of Christy v. Salem,7 an
important self-critical analysis case. This Note demonstrates,
however, that while prior common law undoubtedly informed
the drafters of the PSA, the Act actually created a fairly novel
and more expansive self-critical analysis privilege. Quite simply,
the values and policy concerns of the emergent “patient safety”
movement that inspired the PSA differed from those that
encouraged past courts to create and apply the privilege. As a
result, these two privileges function quite differently: self-critical
analysis under the common law (both in the federal system and
in New Jersey) was traditionally a malleable and “qualified”
privilege,8 applied infrequently and on an ad hoc basis by trial
judges in an attempt to balance competing public and private
interests during discovery. In contrast, the PSA created a more
5

See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But
No Benefit—Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (1999)
(defining peer review as “a process by which members of a hospital’s
medical staff review the qualifications, medical outcomes and professional
conduct of other physician members and medical staff applicants to determine
whether the reviewed physicians may practice in the hospital and, if so, to
determine the parameters of their practice”) (citations omitted).
6
See, e.g., Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379
(N.D. Ga. 2001); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 197
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.
1970); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991 (N.J. 1985).
7
Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
This case will be discussed in further detail in Parts II and III.
8
See, e.g., Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251 (holding medical peer review
reports are “entitled to a qualified privilege”).
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crystallized, unbending, and absolute privilege, which could
likely produce more consistent, albeit perhaps less equitable,
results in future litigation against hospitals.
Under a PSA regime, trial judges will have less discretion to
shape the course of discovery because the relevant question in
deciding whether to apply a privilege is no longer one which
balances the equities and considers the discoverer’s need for the
information. Instead, courts will resolve distinctly statutory
inquiries: whether a hospital “substantially complied” with the
PSA’s reporting scheme9 or whether the allegedly privileged
materials were created “exclusively” for the purpose of
complying with the PSA.10 As a result, there is a danger that the
PSA, while well intentioned, will spawn unintended mischief
during litigation and may undermine the underlying goal of the
Act—to ensure patient safety in New Jersey.
Part I of this Note tracks the development of self-critical
analysis doctrine in the federal courts, emphasizing the seminal
11
1970 case Bredice v. Doctors Hospital. Part II examines the
history of self-critical analysis in New Jersey and where it stood
on the eve of the PSA’s passage. Part III tells the story of the
PSA—why it was needed, how the Legislature and competing
interest groups united behind the Act, and how the drafters
utilized existing self-critical analysis doctrine in order to further
their goals. Part IV shows, through the recent case of Applegrad
ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila,12 how the PSA has unleashed some
unforeseen results, in large part because, like with any
controversial legislation, interested parties are now asserting
novel interpretations of the Act. Part V argues that these
consequences are a result of the PSA’s misguided attempt to
apply its vision of patient safety to the incompatible common
law principles of self-critical analysis. This Note proposes a
more modest self-critical analysis rule, based not on the laws of
privilege but rather on the Subsequent Remedial Measures

9

See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, 51 A.3d 119, 135 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
10
See id. at 139.
11
50 F.R.D. 249.
12
51 A.3d 119.
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doctrine (commonly referred to as “Rule 407”13), which, in
practice, would deem self-critical materials inadmissible at trial
yet still discoverable. This paradigm strikes a proper balance
between the patient’s right to uncover the truth—regardless of
any intention to sue—and the public interest in encouraging
constant and candid assessments of hospital procedures.
Incidentally, this may even further the PSA’s objective of
limiting adverse health outcomes.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS
PRIVILEGE
Privileges “reflect societal choices that certain relationships
(such as those between husbands and wives) or activities (such
as seeking legal or medical advice) should be valued above
others.”14 Understood another way, privileges are the product of
a principled determination by the privilege creator (typically a
legislature or court) that the public would benefit from certain
information remaining confidential. As one author succinctly
stated, “[S]ociety needs privileges because in their absence,
individuals will be discouraged from engaging in certain socially
desirable behavior.”15 A privilege can thus be regarded as a type
of public interest carve-out to the discovery process, which
otherwise allows for the disclosure of all potentially relevant
material.16
13

FED. R. EVID. 407.
Pam Jenoff, The Case for Candor: Application of the Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege to Corporate Diversity Initiatives, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 569,
576 (2011).
15
Id. at 577. For example, without an attorney-client privilege, a client
may be reluctant to speak frankly with her lawyer, and without a doctorpatient privilege, a patient may be reluctant to inform her physician of
crucial, yet possibly embarrassing, details of her personal health. Society
should (and does) encourage these behaviors, which, respectively, promote
justice and improve health outcomes.
16
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”). Most states have similarly expansive rules. See, e.g., N.Y.
14
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While many privileges are so deeply rooted in our culture
that few would question their necessity—the privilege against
self-incrimination or the attorney-client privilege, for instance—
all privileges are controversial in that they prevent a party from
uncovering facts likely crucial to its case. As Justice Scalia
noted, “[J]ustice . . . is severely harmed by contravention of
‘the fundamental principle that “the public has a right to every
man’s evidence.”’”17 Privileges, the Supreme Court famously
admonished, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”18 In sum,
19
privileges are unabashedly bold vehicles for policymaking.
A. The Doctrinal Roots of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
The self-critical analysis privilege is rooted in the belief that
in certain situations, public policy demands that institutions
engage in evaluative internal investigations and discussions in
order to pinpoint—and hopefully correct—recurring problems or
prior mistakes.20 Because such discussions likely contain
embarrassing or damaging information, participants may not
C.P.L.R. 3101(a) (MCKINNEY 2005) (“There shall be full disclosure of all
matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,
regardless of the burden of proof . . . .”).
17
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2192 (3d ed. 1940) (quoting Lord Hardwicke)).
18
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
19
Because of the extraordinary power that privileges afford, and because
they reflect overarching and often controversial policy decisions, the
secondary question of who has the authority to create a privilege is itself an
important public policy inquiry. Privileges in New York, for example, are
almost entirely a product of statute. New York courts have traditionally
declined to create new privileges. See RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE,
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 5-101 (11th ed. 1995) (“Efforts have been
made to induce the courts to create privileges in favor of additional classes of
persons, but without success.”).
20
See, e.g., Brad Bacon, Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis:
Encouraging Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8 KAN J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 221, 223 (1999) (“The privilege is premised on the rationale that
unimpeded self-criticism serves a social good outweighing the cost of
evidentiary exclusion.”).
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speak frankly if they know their own self-critical analyses could
be discovered by outsiders, or worse, used as evidence against
them in a future lawsuit.21 Therefore, the argument goes, the
contents of these discussions must remain confidential.
The belief that a party should not be compelled to disclose
its self-evaluative material is not novel. Such a rationale is
embedded in two well-recognized and existing protections: (1)
the attorney-client privilege and (2) the work-product doctrine.
The attorney-client privilege ensures the “full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”22 A broad attorney-client privilege
thus encourages a form of self-critical analysis.23 The workproduct doctrine, articulated in Hickman v. Taylor24 and now
codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, prevents a party from discovering documents that
were prepared in “anticipation of litigation.”25 The doctrine
promotes the adversarial system, and more generally ensures
fairness, by preventing a party from unjustly benefiting from the
hard work of its adversary.26 Importantly, the work-product
21

See generally 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES § 1:120 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012).
22
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). In Upjohn,
the Supreme Court recognized that robust attorney-client privilege encourages
corporate entities to investigate and root out possible illegal activities within
their own ranks.
23
See, e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis:
How to Raise It and Use It, 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 504, 507 (1991) (stating that
Upjohn “could have become the cornerstone of the critical self-examination
privilege”). An implicit assumption in both attorney-client and self-critical
analysis privilege is what might be called the proactive “nip it in the bud”
approach, where reliance on forward-looking internal compliance approaches
produces higher degrees of conformity with the law and is therefore more
efficient and desirable than post hoc deterrents and remedies through the
imposition of civil or criminal liability.
24
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
25
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
26
Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not
Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 943 (1983). The doctrine serves a more
forward-thinking goal as well: the quality of attorney work product would
suffer if such material were easily obtainable by adversaries. See id. at 919–
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doctrine is a protection, not a privilege: a court will order
discovery if a litigant asserts a “substantial need” for the
materials,27 although “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative”
28
are always protected.
These “attorney-based protections,” however, do not extend
to more general self-critical materials.29 Most courts have
interpreted the “anticipation of litigation” standard of the workproduct doctrine fairly narrowly, protecting only work product
prepared by an attorney in response to an actual event that could
30
reasonably give rise to litigation. As one commentator noted,
many self-critical procedures and studies are designed to prevent
litigation and thus would “not possess the requisite tie to
litigation to invoke work-product protection.”31 The attorneyclient privilege, on the other hand, only protects confidential
communications between an attorney and her client.32
Information acquired by an attorney from other sources,
including third parties, is not protected, however “confidential”
it may seem in the colloquial sense of the term.33 In sum, neither
20; see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (“Discovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on
wits borrowed from the adversary.”).
27
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) provides that the discovering party can
overcome the protection if it “shows that it has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means.”
28
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(3)(B).
29
Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
to the Drug and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 98–103
(1997).
30
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“Materials
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are
not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.”); see also
Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982)
(“The fact that a defendant anticipates the contingency of litigation resulting
from an accident or an event does not automatically qualify an ‘in house’
report as work product.”).
31
Andel, supra note 29, at 103.
32
Id. at 99.
33
Id. at 100; see also FARRELL, supra note 19, § 5-101 (quoting 7
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the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine can
ensure the confidentiality of self-critical materials. What is
needed is a distinct self-critical analysis privilege.
B. Bredice v. Doctor’s Hospital
Bredice v. Doctors Hospital34 is often acknowledged as the
first case in which a court recognized a common-law self-critical
analysis privilege.35 Ms. Bredice, in her medical malpractice
action, sought discovery of the minutes from medical board
meetings convened by the defendant hospital concerning the
treatment received by her late husband.36 The court observed that
these meetings, which evaluated the performance of medical
staff, were required by the Joint Commissions on Accreditation
of Hospitals and existed for the “sole” purpose of improving
37
care. The court continued:
[T]hese meetings are essential to the continued
improvement in the care and treatment of patients.
Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices
is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject
these discussions and deliberations to the discovery
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2286) (“No pledge of privacy, nor oath of
secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.”).
Particularly within the context of internal compliance efforts, such as in
Upjohn, disclosure to anyone outside the agency of the party, including to
government agencies, may constitute a waiver of the privilege. See In re
Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235–36 (2d Cir. 1993) (deeming company’s
voluntary submission of materials a waiver); Andel, supra note 29, at 100.
Further, the privilege “does not apply when the in-house attorney, who
regularly wears several hats, is performing work that requires management
expertise rather than work that requires legal acumen.” Andel, supra note 29,
at 101.
34
Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
35
Jenoff, supra note 14, at 580 (“[I]n Bredice, a court recognized for the
first time that there was a strong public interest in allowing the free
discussion of information in socially useful critical self-examination, and that
if discovery of such materials were allowed, the flow of information would
halt.”).
36
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 249.
37
Id. at 250.
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process, without a showing of exceptional necessity,
would result in terminating such deliberations.
Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an
atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor’s suggestion
will be used as a denunciation of a colleague’s conduct in
a malpractice suit.38
The court therefore reasoned that there was an
“overwhelming public interest” in keeping these staff meetings
confidential “so that the flow of ideas and advice [could]
39
continue unimpeded.” The court further noted that “what
someone . . . at a subsequent date thought of these acts or
omissions is not relevant to the case.”40 For both of these
reasons, the court concluded that the meetings “are entitled to a
qualified privilege.”41
C. Doctrinal Disputes: How Far Should the Privilege Extend?
Bredice predated Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (promulgated
in 1974), which created a new framework for federal courts to
determine when to recognize new privileges.42 While one could
38

Id.
Id. at 251.
40
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Richards v. Me. Cent. R.R., 21
F.R.D. 590 (D. Me. 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
contention is highly questionable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) allows for the
discovery of materials “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” Documents compiled in the wake of an adverse patient
occurrence are almost certain to include relevant evidence, particularly the
identity of witnesses, and will likely serve, in the words of James F.
Flanagan, as a crucial “‘road map’ of the events” for the discoverer. James
F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 558 (1983). “Any evaluation of the self-critical
report . . . must start with the fact that it is undeniably relevant and of
assistance in resolving the case.” Id.
41
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251.
42
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of
privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States
Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But
in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for
39
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question whether a Bredice holding would survive under a Rule
501 regime, many courts have since relied on Bredice to shield
“self-critical” medical peer reviews.43 In fact, medical peer
reports, along with internal disciplinary investigations44 and
45
certain types of equal employment opportunity reports,
constitute the three types of documents most often afforded selfcritical analysis protection. The common denominator in all
these cases is a court’s determination that the public interest in
encouraging candid analysis outweighs the litigant’s right to that
information.
Self-critical analysis has been litigated almost entirely at the
trial court level.46 “Rely[ing] on their inherent power to control
discovery,”47 trial judges have applied the privilege on an ad hoc
basis, creating what one commentator has referred to as a
“confusing body of case law” with inconsistent results.48 The
which state law supplies the rule of decision.”); FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory
committee’s note.
43
Andel, supra note 29, at 105–06.
44
Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1088 (1983) (citing, as examples, investigations conducted by railroad
companies following an accident in order to “discipline any culpable
employees and ultimately to improve the railroad’s safety” and police
department investigations “when, following an arrest or shooting, a plaintiff
has either alleged a civil rights violation or asserted a wrongful death
claim”).
45
Id. at 1089–90 (describing government contractors’ obligation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to file documents that “candid[ly]”
evaluate their own nondiscrimination procedures).
46
See Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural
(Il)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1352
n.74 (1992) [hereinafter Making Sense of Rules of Privilege].
47
Flanagan, supra note 40, at 575.
48
GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119. Adding to the confusion,
federal courts often treat privileges as matters of “substance” (rather than
procedure) under an Erie analysis and therefore defer to the privilege law in
the state in which they sit. See, e.g., Lawson v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 191
F.R.D. 381, 382 (D. Vt. 1999) (“[T]his Court applies state law in
determining whether a privilege for self-critical analysis exists.”); see also
Spencer Sav. Bank, SLA v. Excell Mortg. Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 836
(D.N.J. 1997) (“[A] federal court may ‘resort to state law analogies for the
development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the
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deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing appeals of
trial court discovery rulings,49 as well as parties’ inability in
many jurisdictions to appeal discovery rulings until a “final”
judgment, have resulted in a dearth of guidance from appellate
courts, which, in turn, has created more unpredictability.50 As a
result, “some jurisdictions have cases with conflicting outcomes
that are barely recognizable.”51 Many courts have also simply
52
rejected the privilege outright.
The privilege’s lack of coherence has forced observers to
grapple with the basic question of whether the self-critical
analysis should be an “absolute” relational privilege of the
attorney-client or doctor-patient type or rather an equitable tool
of trial judges to ensure fairness during discovery and thus more
similar to protections like the work-product doctrine. Despite the
inconsistent application of the privilege, one influential Harvard
Law Review Note discerned three overarching principles to the
application of the privilege in certain scenarios. First, the
privilege seeks to prevent the “dual chilling effect” discovery
would unleash: “the direct chilling effect on the institutional or
individual self-analyst . . . [which] operates to discourage the
analyst from investigating thoroughly and frankly or even from
investigating at all,”53 as well as the chilling effect upon the
data-“supplier,” which “discourage[s] individuals from coming

federal rule is unsettled.’” (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition
Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982))).
49
See, e.g., Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 425 (9th Cir.
1992).
50
See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119.
51
Id.
52
Id. (“The privilege is defined differently in different jurisdictions, but
in most cases the courts have found that the privilege did not apply to facts
before them.”).
53
The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1091–92.
Fear of lawsuits, however, is not the only cause for hesitancy on the
part of self-analysts. If an individual self-analyst is asked by his
superiors to conduct an internal analysis, the individual may temper
his criticism out of a fear that reprisals will result if the analysis
ultimately leads to liability or adverse publicity for the employer.
Id. at 1092.
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forward with relevant information.”54 The second principle is
that evaluations and opinions in self-critical materials are
protected from discovery but the underlying facts upon which
these opinions are based are not,55 a distinction which the Note
criticized, observing that “chilling effects of disclosure often
operate on facts as well as evaluations.”56 The third principle is
that the privilege is not “absolute,” meaning it is applied on a
case-by-case basis, and, even when applied, may be overcome if
a party shows “exceptional need” for the material.57 The Note
likewise criticized this principle, advocating for a more
absolutist privilege approach, analogous to the attorney-client
context, in which judges decline to “weight the equities” in
determining whether to apply the self-critical analysis privilege.58
For much the same reason, the Note criticized the “exceptional
need” concession: “The more crucial the material is to the
[discoverer’s] case, the more likely it is to be the type of
material that the privilege was designed to protect.”59 The Note
therefore criticized courts for “fail[ing] to give the privilege
sufficiently broad application to effectuate the important policies
underlying it.”60
In contrast, James F. Flanagan, in Rejecting a General
Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, asserted that self-critical
analysis is not an “evidentiary privilege” and should instead be
regarded as “an exercise in discretionary protection founded in
the court’s power over discovery.”61 Self-critical analysis is thus

54

Id. at 1092. “Without the privilege, as the risk of liability for the
institution increases, the likelihood that witnesses will come forward
decreases.” Id.
55
Id. at 1093–94. This same distinction exists in work-product doctrine.
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (protecting “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)
(recognizing that thoughts are “inviolate” and “outside the arena of
discovery”).
56
The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1095.
57
Id. at 1096–97.
58
Id. at 1098.
59
Id. at 1099.
60
Id. at 1100.
61
Flanagan, supra note 40, at 576.
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similar to the work-product doctrine, which protects certain
materials from discovery absent a showing of “sufficient
need.”62 Flanagan concedes that protecting medical peer reviews
from malpractice plaintiffs is necessary, recognizing that “a
failure to ensure [their] confidentiality will diminish the[ir]
quality.”63 Yet he also observes that many states nevertheless
protect these reports in the form of “peer review statutes,”
which, unlike a general self-critical analysis rule, “provide
sufficient exceptions so that no litigant will be seriously
prejudiced because he cannot discover who was present or what
64
occurred during a relevant review proceeding.” Flanagan thus
concludes that while self-critical analysis may be a worthwhile
public policy, it is undeserving of an unqualified privilege.65
D. The Current State of Self-Critical Analysis
While the self-critical analysis doctrine has likely informed
many medical peer-review statutes,66 it has certainly not gained
recognition as a general privilege. Instead, the privilege has
been maintained as an equitable tool for trial courts to shield
documents not otherwise protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work-product doctrine.67 There is little agreement
62

Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
64
Id. at 577. As discussed infra Parts II & III, New Jersey is one of the
few states in which medical peer-review protections are not derived from
statute, but rather from decisional law (the exception being the “utilization
review” privilege, see infra Parts II & III).
65
Flanagan, supra note 40, at 582 (“At best there are compelling reasons
for courts to consider requests for discovery of peer reviews, to weigh
alternatives, and to seek the least harmful means of disclosure.”).
66
GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:121 (“State law relating to
privileges is often governed by statute, and many states have statutes adopting
forms of a self-evaluative privilege in a very limited context. For example,
most states afford some confidentiality to medical peer reviews of patient
care.”).
67
Id. (observing that “in order to provide additional protection [aside
from the attorney-client and work-product protections], some courts have
recognized [the self-critical analysis privilege] to protect institutional selfanalysis from outside discovery”).
63
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even in those three areas where courts typically apply the
privilege.68 For example, one court observed that employment
discrimination cases “are all over the map on whether the selfevaluative privilege exists,” noting that “[t]he privilege is a
creature of the state trial courts, and there is little uniformity of
law even within particular states.”69 Even courts recognizing a
self-critical analysis privilege have mostly found it did not apply
70
in the cases before them.
The Supreme Court’s decision in University of Pennsylvania
v. EEOC,71 which declined to recognize a peer-review privilege,
was a discernible setback for the self-critical analysis movement.
The University of Pennsylvania, defendant in a Title VII
discrimination suit, refused to turn over tenure review files,
arguing that courts should embrace a “common law” peer
72
review privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The
Court held that “although Rule 501 manifests a congressional
desire . . . [to] provide the courts with flexibility to develop
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis . . . we are disinclined
to exercise this authority expansively.”73 The University’s peer
review claim was, at its core, one of self-critical analysis. Both
privileges posit that society should encourage the frank
evaluations of experts in a given field on matters of public
import, even at the expense of denying individual litigants access
74
to plainly relevant materials. The Court’s rebuff of the
University’s policy rationale thus foreclosed a similar selfcritical analysis defense in the future. As such, subsequent
68

See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
Walker v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 227 F.R.D. 529, 532 (N.D. Cal.
2005); see also Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 611 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (observing self-critical analysis law in federal discrimination
cases to be “in disarray”).
70
See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119.
71
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
72
Id. at 188–89.
73
Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
74
See, e.g., Making Sense of Rules of Privilege, supra note 46, at 1352
n.75 (observing that the academic peer review privilege “center[s] upon many
of the same normative and empirical arguments that dominate the self-critical
analysis privilege area”).
69
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courts have relied on University of Pennsylvania to reject a selfcritical analysis privilege.75
Today, many courts rely on the four-part test articulated by
the Ninth Circuit in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,76
which held that a party asserting the privilege must show that:
“[1] the information must result from a critical selfanalysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; [2]
the public must have a strong interest in preserving the
free flow of the type of information sought; [3] the
information must be of the type whose flow would be
curtailed if discovery were allowed.” . . . [And 4, that
the document] was prepared with the expectation that it
would be kept confidential, and has in fact been kept
confidential.77
In Dowling, the court allowed the plaintiff, in his personal
injury action under the Jones Act,78 to discover the factual
content of the defendant cruise ship’s preaccident safety
committee meeting minutes, reasoning that “organizations have
many incentives to conduct such reviews that outweigh the harm
that might result from disclosure,” such as fear of other lawsuits
or simply “to avoid developing a reputation for having an unsafe
premises.”79
Altogether, the federal courts have generally declined to
extend application of the self-critical analysis doctrine.80 Despite

75

Jenoff, supra note 14, at 585 (observing that the majority of lower
courts have “seemed to take University of Pennsylvania as a broad mandate
to reject the self-critical analysis privilege” in the employment context).
76
Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
77
Id. at 426 (citations omitted) (quoting The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, supra note 44, at 1086).
78
The Jones Act, also known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
empowers injured seamen with a tort remedy. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2011) (“A
seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil
action at law . . . .”).
79
Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426. Remanding the case, the court did not
explicitly rule on whether opinions and conclusions would still be protected.
Id. at 427.
80
See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119.
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the best efforts of the defendants’ bar and corporate counsel,81
the dream of a broad and impenetrable general privilege, as
articulated in the Harvard Note, has not been realized.
II. SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS IN NEW JERSEY
Because the Patient Safety Act referred by name to selfcritical analysis, and because the statute itself explicitly
incorporated the holding of Christy v. Salem,82 an important selfcritical analysis case which itself was the culmination of two
decades of common law development, it is crucial to understand
the status of the doctrine in New Jersey prior to passage of the
PSA. New Jersey courts, much like the federal courts, have
approached the privilege with caution, recognizing it only in
limited situations.
A. The Lead-Up to Christy
Christy represents a synthesis of two separate streams of case
law—those that confront the self-critical analysis privilege within
the context of medical peer reviews, and those that deal with the
privilege more generally. The most important case, Payton v.
New Jersey Turnpike Authority,83 was the latter type. Christy
could be understood as an application of Payton in the medical
context. To appreciate the relevance of Christy, a very brief

81

For example, the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, a
trade group “dedicated to representation of insurers and corporations,” FED’N
DEF. & CORP. COUNS., http://www.thefederation.org/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2013), recently published an article in their quarterly journal advocating for
formal adoption of the privilege, Kurtis B. Reeg & Mathew A. Temper, The
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege: It Is Time for Formal Adoption, 62 FED’N
DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 80 (2011).
82
The statute provides that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to
increase or decrease the discoverability, in accordance with Christy . . . of
any documents, materials or information if obtained from any source or
context other than those specified in this act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H12.25(k) (West 2007) (citation omitted). For much more on this, see infra
Part III.
83
Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997).
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historical sketch of self-critical analysis in New Jersey is in
order.
The first case to grapple with the privilege was Wylie v.
Mills,84 a lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident, where a
defendant utility company sought protection of a document titled
“[City of] Elizabeth Electric Transmission & Distribution
Committee
Investigation—Automobile
Accident,”
which
purported to “determine whether [the defendant] should alter its
procedures to avoid future injuries to employees.”85 While the
court summarily rejected the defendant’s contention that the
document was protected under a work-product or attorney-client
privilege, it found defendant’s assertion of the “nascent” selfcritical analysis protection to be a “more formidable and
persuasive argument.”86 Citing Bredice, the court determined
that “confidentiality and the ‘public need for confidentiality’ are
the sine qua non of effective internal self-critical analysis”87 and
protected the evaluative portions of the report while ordering
disclosure of the factual portions.
One year later, in 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
McClain v. College Hospital, expounded upon Wylie’s
88
discussion of the privilege. Within the context of medical peer
reviews, the court ruled that the plaintiff/discoverer must show
particularized need that outweighs the public interest in
confidentiality of the investigative proceedings, taking
into account (1) the extent to which the information may
be available from other sources, (2) the degree of harm
that the litigant will suffer from its unavailability, and (3)
the possible prejudice to the agency’s investigation.89

84

Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). A
Westlaw search reveals this to be the first New Jersey case in which a court
either used the phrase “self-critical analysis” or cited Bredice.
85
Id. at 1275.
86
Id. at 1276.
87
Id. at 1277.
88
McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 997–98 (N.J. 1985).
89
Id. at 993.
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Guided by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
EPA v. Mink,90 which held that factual material could be
“severed” and thus disclosed from otherwise privileged
documents, the court remanded the case and ordered an in
camera inspection of the documents, holding that “strictly
factual” contents be disclosed but that “matters of opinion or
conjecture” be entitled to a “higher degree of protection.”91
92
In Bundy v. Sinopoli, the court noted that the legislature
created a privilege for a hospital’s “utilization review
committee” reports93 and also provided broad immunity for
94
participants’ statements made during the peer review process
yet also observed that “[t]he Legislature has not . . . provided
for a privilege regarding the information contained within the
Peer Review process.”95 The court nonetheless held the
evaluations therein were “absolutely protected” under the
“common law” self-critical analysis doctrine enunciated under
Wylie and McClain.96
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Payton scaled
back Wylie’s and Bundy’s broad interpretation of the privilege.
Payton, in the course of her sexual harassment suit, sought to
discover the minutes of the “executive session” her employer
convened in response to allegations of harassment.97 The court
was confronted with two competing public interests, both of
which further the same goal of limiting incidents of sexual
harassment: “disclosure to ensure that employers maintain
effective sexual-harassment procedures and nondisclosure to
90

EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
McClain, 492 A.2d at 1000.
92
Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
93
These documents, resulting from peer review, are created as a
condition of receiving federal funding under the Social Security Act. See id.
at 1104. The privilege is embodied in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West
2011).
94
Bundy, 580 A.2d at 1106. This immunity protects participants from
defamation claims. See, e.g., Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520 A.2d 1154 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
95
Bundy, 580 A.2d at 1105.
96
Id. at 1106.
97
Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1997).
91
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enable employers to maintain effective procedures that
encourage reporting and candid statements by all involved.”98
The court concluded that self-critical analysis was “not
qualitatively different from other confidential information, and
thus [did] not require the protection of a broad privilege.”99
Payton therefore clarified that self-critical analysis was, at most,
an occasional bulwark against discovery.100
B. Christy v. Salem
On February 17, 2004, the Appellate Division decided
Christy v. Salem.101 In Christy, the plaintiff, in his medical
malpractice action, sought the defendant hospital’s peer review
report after learning that an x-ray material to his claims went
missing and following the depositions of several physicians
which “resulted in [alleged] discrepancies . . . concerning [how]
events unfolded at the hospital.”102 The court noted that the
“conditional” privilege established in Payton empowered trial
courts to protect confidentiality “short of suppression” through
techniques such as “redaction, issuance of confidentiality or gag
103
orders, and sealing of portions of the record.” The court
recognized that “here, unlike Payton [which implicated the
‘public interest’ of preventing sexual harassment], we are
required to balance the private interest of a patient against the
public interest of a hospital”104 and concluded that “plaintiff’s
interest in disclosure does not the have the ‘strong . . .
reflection of important public policies, to outweigh . . .
98

Id. at 329.
Id. at 331.
100
Id.
101
Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
Christy was decided following the January 26, 2004 hearings before the New
Jersey Senate Heath, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee on the
proposed PSA legislation, but prior to the March 4, 2004 committee hearings
in the General Assembly. See infra Part III.
102
Christy, 841 A.2d at 938.
103
Id. at 940 (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 330
(N.J. 1997)).
104
Id.
99
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confidentiality
concerns
under
most,
if
not
all,
105
circumstances.’” On the other hand, the court cited a section
from the New Jersey statute commonly referred to as the
“Patient Bill of Rights”106 as support for the proposition that
patients have a “right to know . . . what happened to them while
in a hospital.”107
Defendants and amicus curiae New Jersey Hospital
Association (“NJHA”) argued that if the court allowed
disclosure of factual materials, it would lead hospitals to simply
exclude them in future peer review documents.108 The court
rejected this contention as “contrary to the reasoning in both
McClain and Payton,”109 questioning whether facts, which
“provide the basis” for self-critical analysis, would be excluded
“simply because [they are] discoverable.”110 Defendants also
argued that plaintiff in any event failed to show a “compelling
need” for the reports, to which the court responded that “[t]he
availability of relevant facts from multiple sources has never in
and of itself prevented discovery . . . . It is not unusual to find
subtle differences in both testimony and documented facts,
which support an argument bearing on credibility.”111 The court
therefore held that the plaintiff need not make a showing of
compelling need to access the factual material of the documents
and ordered their disclosure. The court even ordered disclosure
of a so-called “deliberative” portion concerning the inability of
the committee to reach a resolution on an issue due to “missing
information” because the court believed it could reasonably lead
112
to discovery.
105

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Payton, 691 A.2d at 333).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(c) (West 2007) (empowering a
patient with the right “[t]o obtain from the physician complete, current
information concerning his diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in terms he
can reasonably be expected to understand”).
107
Christy, 841 A.2d at 940.
108
Id. at 939.
109
Id. at 941.
110
Id. at 942.
111
Id. at 941–42.
112
Id. “We are convinced that [defendants] would not be prejudiced by
disclosure, notwithstanding its deliberative nature, because the peer review
106
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Nonetheless, the court refused to allow discovery of the
committee’s opinions and fact-findings. First, the court felt that
the plaintiff did not demonstrate a compelling need for
disclosure because he already “obtained and supplied opinions
from three separate experts supporting his claim of medical
malpractice.”113 Second, the court noted that justifications for
disclosure were based on allegations of the factual discrepancies,
and having inspected the documents in camera, the court was
“convinced” that by allowing disclosure of the other material,
“[the] plaintiff’s compelling needs [had] been addressed.”114 The
court further ruled that the committee’s factual findings were “of
no use to plaintiff, as such findings are within the sole province
of the jury” and that “disclosure might discourage a peer review
committee from making factual findings because such findings
115
often include a determination of what is credible.”
Because the PSA explicitly referenced (without comment) the
holding in Christy, it is worth asking: what was the holding? On
a basic level, it reaffirmed two basic and interrelated principles
of self-critical analysis: first, that facts are generally
discoverable; and second, that privileged material can
nonetheless be discovered upon a showing of “substantial” or
“compelling” need. In short, the privilege is qualified.116
Nonetheless, it is possible that Christy did not have any
discernible holding but was instead a series of fact-sensitive
rulings—a good faith attempt to balance the competing interests
and equities of rival discovery claims. The Christy court
happened to conclude that the plaintiff demonstrated a
compelling need to discover factual materials. One cannot be
sure that the Christy court would reach the same conclusion in
only slightly different circumstances. For example, the plaintiff
in Christy was denied discovery of the evaluative materials
committee has itself been unable to resolve the issue due to the missing
information, the possible whereabouts of which is described in the subject
sentence.” Id. at 942.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 942–43.
116
The references to Christy during the Senate hearings seem to
subscribe to this reading. See infra Part III.
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because the court was “convinced” that his compelling needs
were addressed through disclosure of the factual documents.
How would the court rule if, next time, it was “convinced” that
the evaluations, and not the factual material, were more likely to
meet a plaintiff’s needs? Christy should have even less
precedential value considering that the documents at issue were
confidential, inspected in camera, and without description in the
decision. One must therefore consider the possibility that Christy
was simply an application of existing self-critical analysis
doctrine, specifically the McClain and Payton rules. Perhaps the
court never intended to make new law.117
III. THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT
A. The Patient Safety Movement
The PSA is New Jersey’s response to the relatively recent
healthcare discipline known as “patient safety,” which examines
the institutional problems in complex healthcare systems that
cause medical errors.118 The discipline stresses that the vigilant
117

Judge Raymond A. Reddin, the trial Judge in Applegrad ex rel. C.A.
v. Bentolilia, see infra Part IV, raised a related point during oral arguments:
Cases are not firmly rooted in cement. They change. They are
modified . . . . So, what happens to this Patient Safety Act if the
Supreme Court either expands Christy, reduces the scope of Christy,
overrules Christy? Does not the legislature then have to say, we read
what the Supreme court did in this decision and notwithstanding that,
okay, forget what we said about Christy, now we say the holding in
whatever this new case is doesn’t change anything? . . . . [D]id not
the legislature posit the Patient Safety Act on something that isn’t
strong footed? I mean, did they anchor the boat to something that
may not be there tomorrow?
Stenographic Transcript of Proceeding Hearings, September 7, 2011, at 14–
16, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Sept. 26, 2011).
118
See Linda Emanuel et al., What Exactly Is Patient Safety?, in 1
ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES 4 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2008), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/advances2/vol1/Advances-EmanuelBerwick_110.pdf (defining patient safety both as “a discipline in the health
care sector that applies safety science methods toward the goal of achieving a
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patrolling, reporting, and analysis of healthcare phenomena—
particularly adverse incidents (such as the event giving rise to
the peer review in Bredice) and so-called “near misses”—will
allow providers and policymakers to locate, and ultimately fix,
the mechanisms that allowed for the error in the first place.119
The 1999 Institute of Medicine Report, To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System, which alarmingly estimated that
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans died each year as a result
of preventable medical errors,120 effectively launched the Patient
Safety Movement in America.121 Within months of publication,
President Clinton called for the creation of nationwide errorreporting systems and mandated the introduction of patient safety
programs for hospitals participating in Medicare.122 Federal and
state agencies, hospitals, and other health providers followed
suit, initiating mandatory reporting systems, improved health
records systems, and other policies attempting to root out errors
in medicine.123 In 2005, Congress passed the Patient Safety and
124
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”), which created
Patient Safety Organizations (“PSOs”) “to collect, aggregate,
and analyze confidential information reported by health care
providers” on a privileged and confidential basis, for analysis of

trustworthy system of health care delivery” and as “an attribute of health care
systems; it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and maximizes recovery
from, adverse events”).
119
See id. at 2, 5–6; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(d) (West
2007 & Supp. 2012); George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety—
Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation Against Hospitals, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2065 (2006).
120
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2000).
121
See Bob Wachter, The Patient Safety Movement Turns Ten, HEALTH
CARE BLOG (Dec. 2, 2009), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2009/12/02/
the-patient-safety-movement-turns-ten/.
122
Fred Charatan, Clinton Acts to Reduce Medical Mistakes, 320 BRIT.
MED. J. 597, 597 (2000).
123
See generally Lucian Leape & Don Berwick, Five Years After To Err
Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384 (2005).
124
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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patient safety events.125 New Jersey sought to create a similar
patient safety regime.
B. The New Jersey Patient Safety Act
The New Jersey Patient Safety Act was, in part, a response
to revelations that a New Jersey nurse named Charles Cullen
had administered lethal doses of medication to over forty
patients under his care over a several-year period at roughly a
dozen different facilities.126 The PSA’s drafters believed that a
more robust centralized reporting system could have sooner
uncovered Mr. Cullen’s crimes.127
The portion of the Act entitled “Findings, declarations
relative to patient safety” accurately summed up some basic
128
tenets of the patient safety movement. Readers should take

125

The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, AGENCY
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (June 2008), http://www.ahrq.gov/
qual/psoact.htm. The agency specifically cites the Institute of Medicine
Report as the impetus for the bill.
126
Senator Joseph F. Vitale, Chairman of the Senate Health and Human
Services and Senior Citizens Committee, remarked during committee hearings
that “this [bill] is, in part, due to the recent revelations of Charles Cullen,
who has professed to have killed at least 40 individuals under his care.”
Testimony on the Patient Safety Act: Hearing on S.B. 557 Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Human Servs. & Senior Citizens, 211th Leg., 2004–2005
Sess., at 2 (N.J. 2004) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. In 2006, Cullen pleaded
guilty to twenty-nine counts of murder and six counts of attempted murder in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts. Sophie Sohn & Allan Chernoff, Killer
Nurse Gets 11 Life Sentences, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2006, 11:11 AM),
http://articles.cnn.com/2006-03-02/justice/killer.nurse_1_cullen-names-killernurse-john-shanagher?_s=PM:LAW.
127
See Senate Hearing, supra note 126, at 31 (testimony of U.S. Senator
Frank Lautenberg’s Office) (commending the committee “for convening this
important hearing to discuss recommendations to improve the integrity and
safety of our health-care system in the wake of the tragic murders carried out
by Charles Cullen”); id. at 41 (testimony of David Knowlton, Chairman,
New Jersey Health Care Quality Institute) (“[I]n the Cullen case, there were
people who had concerns, but they—if they’re a nurse, they [first] have to
report it to a supervisor. . . . [T]he new bill that you’ve just approved . . .
would provide immunity.”).
128
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
FOR
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special note of subsection (e), as it seems to address medical
malpractice litigation:
The Legislature finds and declares that:
a. Adverse events, some of which are the result of
preventable errors, are inherent in all systems, and . . .
the great majority of medical errors result from systems
problems, not individual incompetence; . . .
e. To encourage disclosure of these events so that they
can be analyzed and used for improvement, it is critical
to create a non-punitive culture that focuses on improving
processes rather than assigning blame. Health care
facilities and professionals must be held accountable for
serious preventable adverse events; however, punitive
environments are not particularly effective in promoting
accountability and increasing patient safety, and may be a
deterrent to the exchange of information required to
reduce the opportunity for errors to occur in the complex
systems of care delivery. Fear of sanctions induces health
care professionals and organizations to be silent about
adverse events, resulting in serious under-reporting; and
f. By establishing an environment that both mandates the
confidential disclosure of the most serious, preventable
adverse events, and also encourages the voluntary,
anonymous and confidential disclosure of less serious
adverse events, as well as preventable events and near
misses, the State seeks to increase the amount of
information on systems failures, analyze the sources of
these failures and disseminate information on effective
practices for reducing systems failures and improving the
129
safety of patients.
To further these legislative goals, the Act mandated
healthcare facilities to report every “serious preventable adverse
event” to the Department of Health and Senior Services130 and to

129
130

Id.
Id. § 26:2H-12.25(c).
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notify patients of such occurrences “in a timely fashion.”131
Crucially, the Act provided that:
Any documents, materials or information developed by a
health care facility as part of a process of self-critical
analysis conducted pursuant to subsection b. of this
section . . . shall not be . . . subject to discovery or
admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any
civil,
criminal
or
administrative
action
or
132
proceeding . . . .
As indicated earlier, the Appellate Division decided Christy
while the Patient Safety bill was already in the midst of
discussions at the committee level. The drafters of the PSA
added subsection (k), in an attempt to clarify the new privilege it
had just created: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to
increase or decrease the discoverability, in accordance with
Christy v. Salem . . . of any documents, materials or
information if obtained from any source or context other than
those specified in this act.”133
This late addition of subsection (k) was the product of
extensive negotiations with Senate and Assembly members and
representatives from both NJHA and the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America—New Jersey (“ATLA-NJ”) immediately
prior to the Assembly hearing.134 Evidently, and somewhat

131

Id. § 26:2H-12.25(d).
Id. § 26:2H-12.25(g) (emphasis added).
133
Id. § 26:2H-12.25(k).
134
Drew Britcher, in the NJAJ amicus brief in Applegrad noted that:
[O]n the day that the General Assembly Health Committee was to
entertain the bill, the hearing of testimony regarding the bill was
held until certain amendments, namely the provision concerning
Christy . . . were presented with the assistance of the Office of
Legislative Services. Indeed, the discussions concerning the inclusion
of a specific case reference were so lengthy that they warranted a
comment by the Assembly Health Committee Chairperson, the
Honorable Loretta Weinberg that “we just completed the longest
recess in the history of committee meetings.”
Brief on Behalf of New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ) at 3, Applegrad
ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Sept. 26, 2011).
132
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surprisingly, both NJHA and ATLA-NJ found Christy’s holding
acceptable and lobbied for its inclusion in the PSA before
agreeing to publicly support the legislation. All sides professed
satisfaction. Elizabeth Ryan, General Counsel of NJHA,
referring to the bill as “landmark legislation,” thanked the
committee for “preserving” Christy, a case “very important to
the provider community.”135 Drew Britcher of ATLA-NJ
136
likewise applauded Christy’s codification.
That the PSA secured the endorsement of two oft-adverse
interest groups was not lost on the bill’s drafters. Sitting
between Ms. Ryan and Mr. Britcher, sponsor Senator Joseph
Vitale proclaimed that “we’re here together in accord over this
bill.”137 Clifton Lacy, Commissioner of the Department of
Health and Senior Services, emphasized the need for additional
protections, citing to a National Association of State Health
Policy report indicating that, of the twenty-one states with
legislation mandating the reporting of medical errors, New
Jersey was alone in not also legislating a peer-review
privilege.138 Commissioner Lacy asserted that “the focus on
finding who did wrong rather than why things go wrong is the
major obstacle in improving safety across this country,”139 and
commended the bill for “shield[ing] self-critical analysis from
discovery but maintain[ing as] discoverable all that is now
discoverable.”140 The PSA passed both houses soon thereafter,
was signed into law by Governor Jim McGreevey on April 27,
2004, and went into effect on October 24 of that year.141
135

Legislative Hearing on Patient Safety Act Before the Gen. Assemb.
Comm. on Health, Human Servs. & Senior Citizens, 211th Leg., 2004–2005
Sess., at 7 (N.J. 2004) [hereinafter Assembly Hearing].
136
See id. at 22–23 (praising the “preservation of the discoverability . . .
reconfirmed recently by our courts,” which “draw[s] an important balance
between the absolutely vital aspect of trying to identify medical error . . .
while at the same time recognizing . . . [that] the patient does need to know
what has happened to them”).
137
Id. at 2.
138
Id. at 19–20.
139
Id. at 15.
140
Id. at 19.
141
See Press Release, N.J. Gov. Jim McGreevey, McGreevey Signs
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IV. DUELING INTERPRETATIONS, UNINTENDED MISCHIEF
A. Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila
Despite the good feelings on all sides surrounding the
passage of the statute, a glaring inconsistency existed in the
PSA: subsection (g) provided—without exception or ambiguity—
that the materials developed as a process of self-critical analysis
“shall not be subject to discovery or admissible as evidence,”
while subsection (k) codified Christy, which provided for the
disclosure of certain self-critical materials. The Appellate
Division was confronted with this dilemma in Appelgrad ex rel.
C.A. v. Bentolila, where plaintiffs Esther and Gedalia
Applegrad, on behalf of their infant child “C.A.,” alleged
medical malpractice against Valley Hospital (“Valley”) for the
brain damage and oxygen deprivation sustained by C.A. during
delivery.142 During discovery, Valley withheld six documents,
143
which it asserted were absolutely privileged. The motion judge
sided with Valley, ruling that the PSA was a “legislative
overruling” of Christy and that the materials were fully
protected from disclosure.144
On appeal, the Appellate Division noted that “[a]lthough not
specifically mentioned in Christy, several regulatory and
professional standards existed before . . . adoption of the PSA
Landmark
Law
Protecting
NJ’s
Families
(Apr.
27,
2004),
http://web.archive.org/web/20041116163012/http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/
governor/njnewsline/view_article_archives.pl?id=1884; Medical Errors and
Patient Safety – New Jersey, QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY, http://qups.org/
med_errors.php?c=individual_state&s=31&t=1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
142
Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-0908-08,
2011 WL 13700, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011).
143
Id. at *2. Valley identified those documents: “Occurrence Report;
Director of Patient Safety Post Incident Analysis; Department of Risk
Management Request for Quality Assurance Review; Mother/Baby Quality
Assurance/Performance Improvement Review; Department of OB/GYN Quality
Assurance Response; and Utilization Review Committee, Quality Assessment
and Improvement Subcommittee of the Department of OB/GYN.” Id.
144
Id. at *4. Initially, the judge ordered disclosure of two documents but
changed course following an ex parte meeting with defense counsel, who for
the first time asserted privilege under the PSA. Id.
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. . . that pertain to the activities of hospitals in engaging in
forms of internal self-assessments and reporting[,] some or all
. . . apparently continu[ing] to this day.”145 The question,
therefore, was, how did the PSA alter existing law?
Valley and amicus NJHA argued that the PSA represented a
“sweeping change in the law of privilege, . . . insulat[ing] from
disclosure a wide range of documents and information that
146
previously may have been subject to disclosure.” On that
view, subsection (k) simply clarified that documents not
produced pursuant to the PSA would still be subject to a Christy
analysis and remain partially discoverable.147 Plaintiffs and
amicus New Jersey Association for Justice (formerly ATLANJ)148 argued that “Christy’s factual/evaluative distinction still
applies to documents generated under the PSA”149 and that, at
any rate, the privilege should not apply because there was no
proof that Valley actually reported the Applegrad event to state
officials pursuant to the Act.150
Nonetheless, the court eschewed answering any of these
“interpretative issues” due to what it felt were “especially
troublesome” “uncertainties” in the record regarding why and
151
how these withheld documents actually came into being :

145

Id. at *7. For example, the court observed that the Legislature
directed hospitals to develop “peer review quality assurance processes” but
pointedly did not provide that such documents be privileged. Also, hospitals,
in accordance with guidelines established by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, had already engaged in “selfcritical analysis procedures” to determine the “root cause” of adverse
occurrences. Id. at *6.
146
Id. at *8. It is worth remembering that NJHA supported the Patient
Safety bill because of, not in spite of, the “preservation” of Christy. See
supra Part III.
147
Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. NJHA specifically cited the
preservation of Christy as grounds for supporting the PSA at the General
Assembly hearing. See supra Part III.
148
NJAJ was represented by Drew Britcher, former president of ATLANJ, who testified at the General Assembly hearing. See supra Part III.
149
Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8.
150
Id.
151
Id. at *8, *9.
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One of the documents . . . bears a heading of
“Occurrence Report,” with no further explanatory label
or statutory cross-reference. Another one . . . contains a
boxed legend on its first page citing the PSA, stating that
“This Quality Assurance Document was created and is
protected in accordance with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 et
seq.” Two of the documents . . . bear a different heading
with
no
statutory
citation:
“CONFIDENTIAL
RISK MANAGEMENT / QUALITY ASSURANCE
DOCUMENT.” Another document . . . contains no label
and is on business letterhead. Lastly, the document dated
September
10,
2007
bears
this
heading:
“CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED Pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A[-]22.8,” the utilization review
statute.152
The court exclaimed that “mere labeling of a hospital
document does not necessarily control its legal classification.”153
The court also noted Valley’s inability to explain how selfcritical “organizational structures and processes” actually
changed in the wake of the PSA’s enactment.154 The court
therefore remanded the case, directing Valley to explain in
greater detail “the internal processes within the hospital that
generated each document, and how those processes relate to . . .
other standards apart from the PSA.”155
Finally, and most curiously, the court suggested in a footnote
that the PSA’s “restriction on evidential admissibility in the
courts” may have improperly limited the judiciary’s powers in
violation of the New Jersey Constitution and that the Legislature
“apparent[ly] fail[ed] to follow the proscribed procedures for the
156
adoption of evidence rules under the Evidence Act of 1960.”
152

Id. at *9. A seemingly exasperated court exclaimed, “[W]e are unsure
what to make of this hodgepodge of labels.” Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. For example, the record was silent on how the functions and
authority of Valley’s “Patient Safety Director” (created pursuant to the PSA)
corresponded to the other “related ongoing [peer-review] operations within
the hospital.” Id.
155
Id. at *11.
156
Id. at *8 n.8; see N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 11, cl. 3 (providing that
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However, the court declined to comment further because neither
party challenged the PSA on separation of powers grounds.157
B. Remand: Judge Reddin’s Opinion
On remand, Valley asserted that only two out of six
documents were deserving of PSA protection: a summary of a
roundtable discussion convened by the hospital’s Director of
Patient Safety to engage in a self-critical analysis of the
Applegrad occurrence (“DV2”) and a document which
memorialized specific activities conducted following the
roundtable discussion (“DV5”).158 Following in camera
inspection, testimony of hospital officials, and several days of
oral arguments, the trial judge, the Honorable Raymond A.
159
Reddin, delivered an oral ruling. While recognizing “some
inconsistency between Christy and the language of the statute,”160
he nonetheless ruled that the intent of the PSA was to allow
individuals to “speak freely without a fear of retribution” and
therefore the self-critical analysis documents created pursuant to
the Act were “entitled to a full privilege and no Christy analysis
161
Nonetheless, the judge held this absolute
is warranted.”
“[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all
courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts”). The Evidence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-33–34 (West
2011) mandates special procedures to ensure that rules of evidence be
adopted only through the joint collaboration of all three branches of
government. See State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285, 294–97 (N.J. 2009)
(discussing the history of and rationale for the Rules of Evidence).
157
Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8.
158
See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119,
129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“Defendants, on reflection, modified
their earlier position that all of the withheld documents were privileged under
the PSA, and instead limited their claims of PSA confidentiality to exhibits
DV2 and DV5.”). See subheadings “DV2” and “DV5,” id. at 132–33,
detailing the purpose of each document.
159
Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings Decision, Sept. 12, 2011,
Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Sept. 12 Record].
160
Id. at 26.
161
Id. at 31.
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privilege be construed narrowly.162 As such, the judge ordered
the disclosure of the names of the participants and the date of
the discussion in DV2.163 He also ruled that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague and that because “[the] Legislature
showed respect to the Supreme Court” in acknowledging
Christy, the PSA did not violate separation of powers
principles.164
The judge then turned to the documents in question. Having
interpreted the PSA to create a full privilege, the judge was left
to fashion an appropriate test for when to actually apply the
privilege. The judge concluded that, notwithstanding Valley’s
failure to report the incident, Valley had prepared DV2 in “good
faith” and “substantial[ly] compli[ed]” with the PSA, and thus
was entitled to the protections of the statute.165 Nonetheless, the
judge suggested that the eventual trial judge, as “gatekeeper,”
should have a copy of the confidential documents to ensure that
no eventual witness gives testimony contradicting the document
because “the court can never function in a way [allowing the
presentation of] improper testimony.”166 The judge reasoned that
this caveat was simply a matter of judicial “integrity.”167 On the
other hand, the judge found DV5 to be a “Risk Management” or
162

Id. at 50–51.
As support, the judge cited a prior New Jersey case ordering an
attorney to reveal the address of a client, attorney-client privilege
notwithstanding. See id. at 52–53 (citing Horon Holding Corp. v. McKenzie,
775 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)). That the judge felt
compelled to utilize case precedent dealing with an entirely different privilege
should indicate the novelty of the legal questions presented in Applegrad.
164
Id. at 39.
165
Id. at 51. If, on the other hand, the judge detected “bad faith or fraud
or concealment or a cover up . . . . [The protection] could be lost and the
sanction should be beyond [the hospital] paying a fine. Paying a fine does
nothing to the person who had treatment and had a concealment occur . . . .”
Id.
166
Id. at 61–62.
167
Id. The judge also suggested the appointment of a “discovery master”
to monitor the process and to “see if there’s any problems that are later
developed.” Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings Supplemental Decision at
24, Sept. 14, 2011, Applegrad, No. PAS-L-908-08 [hereinafter Sept. 14
Record].
163
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“Quality Assurance document,” developed independent of the
PSA and was therefore subject to a Christy analysis.168
Remarkably, the judge found that the PSA “has done nothing
to change the pre-Patient Safety Act statutes and regulations
. . . . All the Patient Safety Act does is encourage more
reporting and how things are reported to create an atmosphere of
trust.”169 Specifically with regard to Valley, the court found no
“tremendous difference in the way [it] investigated incidents
before and after the [PSA].”170
Both parties appealed different aspects of Judge Reddin’s
171
Judge Reddin remarked that the “entire medical
ruling.
community” and the “lawyers associated with it” are “looking to
see if this statute is going to be validated or invalidated [and]
. . . if there really will be confidentiality.”172
C. Appellate Decision: Discarding “Substantial Compliance”
for “Exclusivity”
On August 9, 2012, in Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila,
the Appellate Division held that the PSA’s “repeated emphasis
on confidentiality . . . cannot be reconciled with plaintiffs’ claim
168

Sept. 14 Record, supra note 167, at 16.
Id. at 12.
170
Id. at 6.
171
Plaintiffs in particular argued that the trial judge’s interpretation of the
PSA would render it unconstitutional—if the PSA did indeed create an
absolute self-critical analysis privilege, it thus constituted a legislative
overruling of Payton, in which the Supreme Court declined to recognize one.
The trial court therefore “should have rejected . . . that the legislature could
so cavalierly and vaguely create a new privilege . . . . [I]f the Legislature did
[so] . . . without consultation with the Court,” it was in violation of the
Constitution and the Evidence Act. Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Merit Brief at 37–
38, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). The New Jersey Supreme Court, to date, has
not ruled on whether Christy was correctly decided. Certification in
Applegrad was granted on December 6, 2012, and the court will hear
argument later this year. One likely issue is whether the court will be
“bound” by the Appellate Division’s holding in Christy, now that the
Legislature has enshrined it in the PSA.
172
Sept. 12 Record, supra note 159, at 62–63.
169
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that the PSA’s non-disclosure protections must yield to the
exceptions set forth in Christy.”173 As for the inclusion of
subsection (k), the court reasoned that
[T]he Legislature appears to have adopted a dual
approach, i.e., (1) treating materials exclusively
developed under the PSA as subject to the PSA’s specific
confidentiality terms; and (2) treating other internal
materials that are not exclusively developed under the
PSA pursuant to the residual common-law standards set
forth in Christy or other law.”174
The court thus held that “the PSA extends absolute
confidential protection to ‘all documents . . .’ developed
exclusively . . . through the PSA process.”175 The court made
clear the privilege existed “regardless of a plaintiff’s asserted
need for disclosure and regardless of whether the documents
contain factual information in addition to subjective opinions.”176
However, the court issued a crucial caveat:
If, however, such items have been created or developed
through some other “source or context,” then they are
obtainable under the criteria governing such alternative
situations. . . . Thus, if a participant in the PSA process
obtains facts or opinions from other sources or contexts,
such as peer-review material from the facility’s
continuous quality improvement program, those facts or
opinions are not transformed into inaccessible “PSA
materials.” . . . .
The confidentiality of a particular fact or opinion
under the PSA therefore hinges upon an exclusivity test,
requiring the court to consider whether the item was
developed solely under the procedures set forth in the
177
PSA, or whether the item had an independent genesis.

173

Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 138.
Id. at 138–39.
175
Id. at 139 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-12.25(f)–(g) (West
2007 & Supp. 2012)).
176
Id. at 123.
177
Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
174

CODIFYING COMMON LAW

611

The court also made clear that “nothing in the PSA insulates
the underlying facts relating to a patient mishap, if those facts
can be learned from an independent source.”178 Rather, the PSA
protects the committee’s self-critical communications.179 The
court also warned that its “construction of the PSA is not an
invitation to health care providers to shield information that was
previously accessible under Christy or under other law by
indiscriminately labeling such formerly accessible items as ‘PSA
material’” or “to evade the limitations of [the Act] by giving job
titles to hospital personnel such as ‘PSA officers’ when, in fact,
they are performing functions that are not truly covered by the
PSA.”180 Echoing its statement a year earlier enshrining
substance over form,181 the court focused its inquiry on “the
actual functions and activities involved, rather than the
nomenclature adopted.”182
Applying these principles to the documents at hand, the
Appellate Division proceeded to reverse Judge Reddin’s rulings,
determining that DV2 should be made available to the
plaintiffs.183 The court also upheld the constitutionality of the
178

Id. at 140 (emphasis added). “For example, if counsel for a medical
malpractice plaintiff deposes employees within the hospital having personal
knowledge about a patient’s care, those witnesses cannot refuse to answer
factual questions because those same facts also had been made known to the
hospital’s patient safety committee.” Id.
179
Id. (“[W]hat the PSA guards against is the disclosure of
communications made within the PSA process itself, including the self-critical
and deliberative analyses that are undertaken by a patient safety committee.”
(emphasis added)).
180
Id. at 140–41.
181
See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-090808, 2011 WL 13700, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011) (holding
that the “mere labeling of a hospital document does not necessarily control its
legal classification . . . just as the stamping of a document as ‘attorney-client’
or ‘work-product’ does not ensure that the privilege was appropriately
invoked”).
182
Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 141.
183
Id. While conceding that the hospital attempted to comply with the
Act “in good faith,” the court was specifically troubled by the fact that the
roundtable discussion was staffed by nonphysicians and that the committee
chose not to refer the matter to the Patient Safety Committee, despite the
gravity of the incident implicating physician error. Id. at 144.
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PSA (essentially answering the question it raised a year earlier),
noting that “the Legislature has codified other evidentiary
privileges in the past without the Judiciary’s involvement” and
that “[g]iven this backdrop of constitutional and legal history,
we decline to pronounce the confidentiality provisions in the
PSA an invalid exercise of legislative power.”184
Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, arguing that the Appellate Division’s
holding, which in their view imposed additional restrictions on
providers, should not apply retroactively to the specific
185
Tellingly, and quite
documents at issue in Applegrad.
understandably, defendants did not appeal the Appellate
Division’s overall interpretation of the statute.186 The recognition
of an “absolute” PSA privilege will remain the law of the land,
for now.187

184

Id. at 145–46; see also id. at 146 (“[T]he ultimate assessment of this
constitutional question is best reserved to the Supreme Court, as the final
arbiter of the boundaries among our three branches of State government.”).
185
See Brief of Defendants-Appellants in Support of Motion for Leave to
Appeal at 1–2, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. A-1261-11T1 (N.J.
Dec. 4, 2012).
186
See Alicia Gallegos, Patient Safety Law Protects Some Documents in
Court Case, AM. ASS’N MED. NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2012/08/27/prsd0829.htm (quoting Applegrad defense
attorney stating that she was “gratified that the court upheld the privilege”
and that “[i]t was wonderful to see that what hospitals, physicians and nurses
had been concerned about for decades has the ability to go forward [and]
improve health care”).
187
In December 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila,
2012 N.J. LEXIS 1257 (N.J. 2012). Because the issue of “retroactivity”
presented to the court is a fairly narrow one, NJHA is no longer involved as
amicus in the case. E-mail from Ross Lewin, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP,
to author (Oct. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. An Analytical Misfit in the Family of Privileges
The drafters of the PSA should have foreseen that their selfcritical analysis privilege, by its own terms, was destined to
unleash trouble. As argued in Parts I and II of this Note, the
self-critical analysis privilege, as applied in both the federal
system and New Jersey, was always “qualified.” Hence, courts
assessed self-critical analysis on a case-by-case basis. The
privilege could be overcome through the showing of a litigant’s
exceptional need, and even if applied in a given case, the
privilege would not protect facts from disclosure. This dynamic
is in stark contrast to long-established “unqualified” privileges,
such as the attorney-client or spousal varieties, in which courts
refuse to allow for compromise, no matter how compelling the
need, correctly recognizing that allowing for equitable
“exceptions” would undermine the underlying relationships the
privilege was designed to protect.
This Note therefore suggests that much of the controversy
surrounding self-critical analysis is rooted in its unfortunate and
erroneous description as a “privilege,” when a much more
accurate descriptor would be “protection.” In determining
whether a piece of evidence is privileged, a court should not
consider the hardship an opposing party may endure. A
thorough balancing of the positive and negative practical
outcomes of recognizing a privilege is surely a crucial
undertaking, but this must occur at the initial privilege-creating
188
As the Upjohn Court
stage, not during its application.
succinctly stated, “an uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”189
New Jersey and federal courts simply have not approached
self-critical analysis doctrine with this level of deference. The
“uncertainty” endemic to any qualified privilege has been one of
188

See supra Part I. See generally The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis,
supra note 44, at 1097–99.
189
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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the defining characteristics of self-critical analysis. For example,
the Dowling court declined to extend self-critical analysis
protection to the defendant’s safety-review documents because
they “will be invaluable to a plaintiff attempting to prove that
his injury was caused by the company’s negligent failure to
make safe a hazardous condition.”190 (One could hardly imagine
a court ordering disclosure of attorney-client or confidential
psychiatric material because it would be “invaluable” to an
adversary’s case.) Even the Bredice court, which applied the
privilege—and which, incidentally, referred to it as
“qualified”—did so because it felt plaintiff failed to show “good
cause” to discover the materials.191 For the self-critical analyzer
to confidently predict whether a hypothetical discoverer will
successfully argue “good cause” in front of a randomly chosen
judge or magistrate seems next to impossible.
Similarly, in New Jersey, the three-part balancing test
established in McClain emphasized the discoverer’s
192
“particularized need” for the self-critical materials, while
Payton emphasized the court’s role in overseeing an “exquisite
weighing process” in determining whether to shield
documents.193 For example, in Christy, the court refused
disclosure of opinions of the committee, noting that the plaintiff
had already retained experts to support his medical malpractice
claim, but allowed for discovery of other portions which it
believed could reasonably lead to discovery and which would
not prejudice defendant. Finally, the current approach in the
District of New Jersey, which borrows from both New Jersey
and federal law, employs a six-part self-critical analysis test,
194
which emphasizes equity balancing at virtually every stage.
190

Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added).
191
Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970)
(“Absent evidence of extraordinary circumstances, there is no good cause
shown requiring disclosure of the minutes of these meetings.”).
192
McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 993 (N.J. 1985).
193
Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 331 (N.J. 1997) (quoting
Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958, 964 (N.J. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
194
See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health Inc., No. 04-
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This sampling of several self-critical analysis approaches
shows that courts do not treat it like a privilege. A true
“privilege” subject to such a murky and fact-sensitive post hoc
inquiry would seemingly deter the self-critical analyst from the
outset.195 Rather, self-critical analysis is better understood as
analogous to the work-product doctrine, which offers protections
against discovery of certain material but will not overcome a
discoverer’s showing of “substantial” or “compelling” need.196
In legislating that the self-critical materials would not be
discoverable in “any” litigation, thus creating an unbending rule
that did not have built-in “substantial need” exceptions or
fact/evaluation distinctions, the drafters of the PSA rested on the
unfounded premise that the self-critical analysis protection could
be codified like any other privilege. As such, they morphed a
flexible common law rule of discovery into an inflexible
statutory mandate.197
B. Reforming Tort Law Through Evidence Law
The PSA drafters also acted from the well-intentioned yet
mistaken belief that their vision of a patient safety regime could
be reconciled with both the liberal rules of civil discovery, in
which absolute privileges are disfavored, and the traditional
American tort model, in which medical errors are deterred
6025, 2006 WL 2946469, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2006) (“When analyzing
whether the self critical analysis privilege is applicable, a court must balance
(1) whether the information is the result of a self critical analysis undertaken
by the party seeking protection, (2) the extent to which the information is
available from other sources, (3) the degree of harm the litigant will suffer
from the information’s unavailability, (4) the possible prejudice to the party
asserting the privilege, (5) the public interest in preserving the free flow of
the type of information sought, and (6) whether the information is of the type
whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.”).
195
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
196
See Flanagan, supra note 40, at 575.
197
See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
¶ 26.48 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2013) (“That judicial decisions have been
uneven both in their willingness to recognize a privilege for self-critical
analysis and in their ability to define its scope is a predictable consequence of
its common law roots.”).
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through fear that an injured patient, empowered with broad
discovery rights, will bring suit. Patient safety, as a legal
principle, is adverse to private tort litigation because the former
seeks to improve overall health outcomes for patients at the
expense of an individual patient’s discovery rights, while the
latter supports the belief that allowing a patient to discover the
truth of what happened in her case will improve overall
outcomes. As Commissioner Lacy testified in his endorsement of
the PSA, “the focus on finding who did wrong rather than why
things go wrong is the major obstacle in improving safety across
this country.”198 One could dismiss the Commissioner’s opinions
during committee hearings as irrelevant in evaluating legislative
intent.199 But there is no escaping that the “Findings and
Declarations” portion of the statute itself called for combating
“punitive environments,” which it contended “are not
particularly effective in promoting accountability and increasing
patient safety, and may be a deterrent to the exchange of
200
information.” The inclusion of these portions in the bill
reflects the underlying policy judgments of the bill’s drafters to
create a complete self-critical analysis privilege.201 Supporters of
the bill should have anticipated the Act would frustrate a
plaintiff/patient’s opportunity to access relevant evidence.
To be sure, the Legislature attempted to placate various
interest groups by including the reference to Christy in the actual
statute text, implying the privilege would maintain its common
law qualified status.202 But as both Judge Reddin and the
Appellate Division have made clear, the principles embedded in
Christy are simply inconsistent with the overall intent of the
198

See Assembly Hearing, supra note 135, at 15 (emphasis added).
Justice Scalia put the matter rather bluntly in Zedner v. United States,
547 U.S. 489, 511 (Scalia, J., concurring): “[T]he use of legislative history
is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute.”
200
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
201
See, e.g., Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51
A.3d 119, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (observing that § 26:2H12.24 expresses “clear policy objectives to provide greater incentives . . . to
disclose mishaps and perceived risks to patient safety” and is thus
incompatible with the “balancing criteria of Christy”).
202
See supra Part III.
199
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PSA.203 A review of both the legislative history and the plain
meaning of the statute indicates that applying a Christy-like
qualified privilege to PSA materials would thwart the Act’s
explicit goal to afford such documents the simple yet absolute
cloak of confidentiality. The only fair conclusion is that, while
individual drafters or supporters of the bill may have hoped
otherwise, the PSA has limited a patient/plaintiff’s “private
204
right” of discovery in its attempt to further the broader societal
good of improving patient safety.
Understood another way, the Legislature has unleashed a
subtle brand of tort reform.205 Proponents of reform argue that
an aggressive tort system, which in theory purports to deter
unsafe practices and conduct, can actually yield perverse
incentives. In the healthcare context, providers will rationally be
reluctant to engage in conduct benefitting the patient’s or
public’s interest (such as error-reporting) if it could foreseeably
expose them to liability.206
203

See Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 146–47 (holding that PSA’s “repeated
emphasis on confidentiality cannot be reconciled with plaintiffs’ claim that the
PSA’s non-disclosure protections must yield to the exceptions set forth in
Christy”); Sept. 12 Record, supra note 159, at 31 (holding that PSA
documents are “entitled to a full privilege and no Christy analysis is
warranted”).
204
See Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004) (referring to a medical-malpractice plaintiff’s right to discovery as a
private interest, which, unlike those of a civil rights plaintiff, “does not have
the ‘strong . . . reflection of important public policies’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 333 (N.J.
1997))).
205
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining tort reform as
“[a] movement to reduce the amount of tort litigation, usu. involving
legislation that restricts tort remedies or that caps damages awards (esp. for
punitive damages)” and noting that “[a]dvocates of tort reform argue that it
lowers insurance and healthcare costs and prevents windfalls, while
opponents contend that it denies plaintiffs the recovery they deserve for their
injuries”).
206
See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of
Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem
or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 909–14 (2005)
(discussing the “conventional wisdom” that “malpractice liability impedes
efforts to improve patient safety”). As one nursing expert put it, “The threat
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Clearly, this same argument serves not only as a rationale
for traditional tort reform, but also for strong self-critical
analysis protection. While the majority of tort reform has
focused on limiting a defendant’s exposure to damage awards,
often through the institution of a noneconomic recovery cap207 or
through the abolishment of common law joint and several
liability,208 the PSA seeks to redress the perceived excesses of
the tort system through utilizing rules of evidence. Therefore, in
a typical tort reform jurisdiction, a healthcare provider (and its
insurer or indemnifier) could rest assured that damages would
not exceed a specified sum per accident. The PSA’s self-critical
analysis protection, on the other hand, does not limit liability per
se. Instead, it attempts to further the goal of both the tort reform
and the patient safety movements—encouraging the reporting of
errors—by rendering such reports immune to discovery.
C. What Has Changed—And What Will Change—Under the
PSA?
The PSA’s privilege was predicated on the finding that selfcritical analysis could not occur without complete
confidentiality.209 Admittedly, the belief that providers fail to
of medical malpractice litigation is one of the most obvious barriers to the
improvement of patient safety. . . . These risks also serve as disincentives to
participate in improvement strategies to reduce the risk of error.” Id. at 911
(quoting Beverly Jones, Nurses and the “Code of Silence,” in MEDICAL
ERROR: WHAT DO WE KNOW? WHAT DO WE DO? 84, 91–92 (Marilynn
Rosenthal & Kathleen Sutcliffe eds., 2002)).
207
See Noneconomic Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N,
http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconomic-damages-reform (last visited Feb.
24, 2013) (identifying statutory reforms enacted by state).
208
See, e.g., Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, AM. TORT
REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rulereform (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (identifying statutory reforms enacted by
state).
209
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.2H-12.24(2)(f) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012)
(creating “confidential disclosure” processes, thus providing the State with a
means to “increase the amount of information on systems failures, analyze
the sources of these failures and disseminate information on effective
practices for reducing systems failures”); Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila
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report errors out of fear of liability, in the words of one public
health scholar, “is plausible and has intuitive appeal.”210 Still,
there is reason to be skeptical. One 2005 study found an absence
of “any rigorous evidence show[ing] that fear of malpractice
lawsuits discourages error reporting” and that “contrary to the
conventional wisdom, malpractice liability itself has the potential
to kick-start quality improvement.”211 For example, rocketing
malpractice premiums in the 1980s (due to anesthesia-related
deaths) impelled the American Society of Anesthesiologists to
launch an aggressive “patient safety campaign” to study
212
incidents of medical errors in the field. “By the early 1980s,
anesthesiologists recognized that something drastic had to be
done if they were going to continue to be insured,” recalled the
leader of this movement.213 The campaign, while costly, proved
remarkably successful and has caused an astonishing ten-totwenty-fold decrease in deaths over the past few decades.214
Further, failure to report errors may simply be a deeply
rooted cultural phenomenon rather than an economically rational
response to fears of liability. For example, one health scholar
cited to a survey showing that seventy-five percent of U.S.
doctors failed to report errors to their patients, which was not
markedly different from a showing of sixty-one percent in New
Zealand, “a country that has had no-fault malpractice insurance
for more than three decades.”215
(Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012)
(observing that “the Legislature was manifestly concerned” about the
underreporting and analysis of adverse incidents in New Jersey resulting from
the “inhibition” of medical staff from “reporting or criticizing unsafe
practices within the institution”); id. at 127 (observing that “the PSA’s
umbrella of confidentiality” was designed, among other reasons, “to foster
internal self-critical analysis”).
210
Annas, supra note 119, at 2065.
211
Hyman & Silver, supra note 206, at 894.
212
Id. at 919.
213
Id. at 920 (quoting Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., ASA Monitoring Guidelines:
Their Origin and Development, 66 AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSL.,
Sept. 2002, at 22, 22, available at http://www.asahq.org/Newsletters/
2002/9_02/feature7.htm).
214
Id. at 918.
215
See Annas, supra note 119, at 2065.
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Some scholars also question whether privileges actually
enhance the frequency and quality of patient safety procedures.
For example, Susan Scheutzow, a health law practitioner and
academic, through analyzing the National Practitioner Data
Bank, found that peer-review protections, contrary to perceived
wisdom, do not promote the public policy of encouraging peer
review and thus “risk being little more than special interest laws
protecting physicians and hospitals.”216 Scheutzow therefore
argued for the elimination—or at the very least, reformation—of
such laws.217
In light of these general claims, one must ask what the PSA
has accomplished thus far. From a large-scale public policy
perspective, it is too early to tell. Nonetheless, the Applegrad
litigation has brought to light at least one useful case study—the
patient safety apparatus of Valley Hospital.
This much is clear: the Appellate Division recognized that
many regulatory and professional standards already existed prior
to passage of the PSA, many of which called for peer review
and self-evaluation procedures quite similar to those required by
the PSA.218 On remand, and following days of oral arguments
and document inspection, Judge Reddin concluded that he could
discern “no tremendous difference” between Valley’s procedures
prior to and following the PSA. As the judge noted, this reality
does not in itself raise any presumptions of wrongdoing; to the
contrary, it might even show that Valley was ahead of the curve
in patient safety. Yet perhaps even more remarkably, the judge
further found that the PSA “has done nothing” to change prePSA regulations and that “all the Patient Safety Act does is
encourage more reporting . . . to create an atmosphere of
219
trust.”
One must therefore consider the irony that the PSA may
ultimately result in a raw deal for patients—as a result of a
codified and absolute self-critical analysis privilege, they may
216

Scheutzow, supra note 5, at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
218
See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-090808, 2011 WL 13700, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011); see
also supra Part IV.
219
Sept. 14 Record, supra note 167, at 12.
217
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discover less as litigants. At the same time, as hospitals continue
to engage in procedures virtually identical to those prior to the
PSA, they will get little added safety in return.
Providers, on the other hand, may have much to gain.
Initially, Valley asserted that all six of the suppressed materials
were privileged under the PSA.220 Following the Law Division’s
ruling that “the mere labeling of a hospital document does not
necessarily control its legal classification,” Valley changed
course and instead argued that only two documents were “PSA”
materials deserving of a full privilege, conceding that the rest
221
could be subject to a Christy analysis. This author wonders
whether other providers have taken note of Applegrad and have,
as a result, attempted to reconfigure their existing peer review
and adverse occurrence procedures in order to be afforded the
maximum level of protection. Thus, a hospital would prudently
comply with any requisite PSA formalities—however minor and
inconsequential they may be to actual patient safety—simply in
order to demonstrate that it has complied with the statute.
Procedures that could have been introduced for a variety of
reasons could overnight become “patient safety” procedures.222
If a change like this occurs, it could alter the dynamics of
medical malpractice litigation. In such cases, one side—the
defendant—will inevitably possess the vast majority of evidence,
223
both inculpatory and exculpatory. Plaintiffs therefore rely on a
220

Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *2.
This salient fact was not lost on the Appellate Division the second
time around. See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d
119, 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“The Hospital exhibited its
confusion about the PSA in this very litigation by first asserting other
privileges and not invoking the PSA; then arguing, after the trial court’s
initial in camera review, that all of the withheld documents were protected by
the PSA; and ultimately arguing on remand that only DV2 and DV5 are
covered by the PSA.”).
222
Alternatively, the Appellate Division’s “exclusivity test” could result
in an unintended irony: hospitals which (laudably) enacted comprehensive
patient safety procedures prior to enactment of the PSA will now be punished
for their foresight because their initially voluntary practices, now mandated
by the PSA, are not “exclusively” a PSA product and are thus not entitled to
the statutory privilege.
223
See, e.g., Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct.
221
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liberal discovery system to ensure the disclosure of every
possibly relevant document and the deposition of every possible
witness. As the Christy court made clear, a plaintiff has good
cause to discover nearly all hospital documentation concerning
an adverse event, even if the facts are available from alternate
sources, because of the possibility of uncovering “subtle
differences in both testimony and documented facts, which
support an argument bearing on credibility.”224 Therefore, a
plaintiff’s incentives could change if certain hospital documents
become increasingly less available. Under an “absolute” PSA
regime, an incident at a hospital that prompts many peer review
and patient safety sessions will not necessarily imply that there
will be an opportunity for broad discovery of these documents.225
As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more reluctant to take
on cases where negligence (or, for that matter, outright fraud or
cover-up) must be argued circumstantially: for example, through
showing inconsistencies in deposition testimony and patient
safety documents.
There is, of course, a counterargument. While the plaintiffs’
bar may feel that the patient safety movement is simply tort
reform in disguise,226 a regime emphasizing the importance of
App. Div. 2004) (observing that critical evidence regarding claims of medical
malpractice “would logically be expected to be in the possession of an
adversary”).
224
Id. at 941–42.
225
One plaintiff’s attorney, in commenting on Applegrad, opined that:
[T]rying to get discovery from some hospitals is like trying to find
the proverbial needle in a haystack. Except you are first told that: (a)
there is no haystack; (b) if there ever was a haystack, it did not have
any needles; and finally (c) if there was a haystack with a needle,
any discussion of it is privileged. If you persist, you are then advised
that (d) all haystacks and needles were designed, manufactured,
distributed, maintained and utilized by persons who were
independent contractors and, furthermore, (e) the hospital is entitled
to a limitation of liability.
Abbot S. Brown, Hospital Malpractice: Finding the Needle in the Haystack,
N.J.L.J, May 30, 2011, at 1.
226
See generally Peter P. Budetti, Tort Reform and the Patient Safety
Movement: Seeking Common Ground, 293 JAMA 2660, 2618 (2005) (drawing
parallels between the results of tort reform and the patient safety movement).
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patient safety may in fact be more willing to entertain novel
claims of relief for plaintiffs. The health law and bioethics
scholar George Annas, in The Patient’s Right to Safety—
Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation Against
Hospitals,227 argues that:
[J]udicial recognition of an explicit “right to safety” for
hospital patients, with a correlative duty of hospitals to
implement patient-safety measures, can become the
primary motivator for the development of systems to
improve patient safety. Hospitals that do not take specific
actions to improve safety should be viewed as negligent
and be subject to malpractice lawsuits when a violation of
the right to safety results in injury.228
Annas suggests that physicians, patients, and the plaintiffs’
bar join forces to propose initiatives to “pressure hospitals to
229
change their operating systems” to ensure patient safety.
Annas’s argument is important because it reaffirms an obvious
principle of tort law that the PSA minimized: a robust tort
system that constantly patrols for incidents of fault, a system
that (to use the disapproving language of the PSA) cultivates a
“punitive culture” focusing on “assigning blame,”230 can actually
promote, not hinder, the development and implementation of
innovative safety procedures. Plaintiffs’ lawyers may therefore
experiment with new patient-safety-oriented claims for relief in
cases where more traditional negligence theories may be difficult
to prove.
Finally, how will the PSA affect judges? If the statute’s
absolute privilege is upheld, judges will be deprived of the
opportunity to engage in the fact-sensitive and context-oriented
balancing that previously existed under the common law.
Instead, and as occurred in Applegrad, a court’s “exquisite
weighing process” will give way to the more rigid, yet still
complex, task of determining whether the defendant hospital has
in “good faith” “substantially complied” with the Act; or,
227
228
229
230

Annas, supra note 119.
Id. at 2063.
Id. at 2066.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.2H-12.24(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
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according to the Appellate Division’s test, whether the alleged
privileged material was created “exclusively” for PSA
functions.231 Decades of self-critical analysis jurisprudence and
case law will now be of little use to judges confronted with
assertions of a PSA privilege.
On the other hand, perhaps not much will change after all.
Judges, now tasked with determining the contours of the statute,
may develop their own “exquisite weighing process” in
evaluating whether to apply the privilege. First, as the litigation
in Applegrad made clear, merely distinguishing between PSA
documents and related patient-safety/peer-review materials was
itself a controversial and fact-sensitive inquiry.232 Second, the
Appellate Division imposed several requirements on providers,
such as the “exclusivity” test, or the requirement that
“competent” personnel of “various disciplines” administer the
233
reviews. A court will find it difficult to determine whether a
hospital complied with these requirements, and if the facts of
Applegrad are any indicator, it will require days of testimony
(and cross-examination) of hospital staff.234 How can hospitals be
sure that their patient safety documents will be deemed
absolutely privileged in the future, and if they cannot be sure,
will that reality, in and of itself, frustrate the PSA’s primary
goal of encouraging frank discussions and full disclosure? As
one commentator predicts, “Due to the highly fact specific
analysis undertaken by the Court in [Applegrad] and apparently
to be applied by the courts considering the application of this
privilege, uncertainty will remain as to the ultimate outcome in
any given scenario.”235 Yet, as this Note has described,
231

See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119,
139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“[W]hether the item had an
independent genesis [aside from the PSA] . . . at times . . . may be obvious.
At other times, it might not, and would require closer scrutiny of how each
particular fact or opinion was created.”).
232
See id. at 128.
233
Id. at 141–42.
234
Id. at 129 (“On remand, the trial court heard testimony over seven
days from persons at the Hospital who were involved in the development of
the allegedly privileged records.”).
235
Sharlene Hunt, Court Addresses Confidentiality Under the Patient
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“uncertainty” has always been the predominant dynamic of selfcritical analysis. Perhaps the ambiguous patient safety dynamics
that existed under the common law will continue under this new
PSA regime, simply under a new name. The Appellate Division
made the unassailable point that a hospital’s “mere labeling” of
a document as “privileged” counts for very little.236 So too, the
Appellate Division’s recognition of the PSA privilege as being
“absolute” will be of little significance to providers and
plaintiffs in light of the significant caveats the court imposed.
D. Potential for Future Patient Safety: Rule 407
This Note concludes by offering an alternative model for
analyzing self-critical patient safety documents. The fact/opinion
distinction which governed the majority of critical analysis
jurisprudence but was discarded under the PSA represents a
doctrinal and practical compromise for litigants: the discoverer
will be entitled to crucial pieces of evidence, while his adversary
can still maintain a degree of confidence that he will not be
penalized for his investigation. This distinction also recognizes a
more basic reality of trial practice: sometimes opinions can be
237
more damaging than facts. This Note therefore suggests that
the rationale for the self-critical analysis privilege may be better
served through a different evidentiary paradigm, one recognized
in virtually every state, as well as under the Federal Rules of
Evidence: the Subsequent Remedial Measures doctrine.238
Safety
Act,
N.J.
HEALTHCARE
BLOG
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://www.njhealthcareblog.com/2012/08/court-addresses-confidentialityunder-the-patient-safety-act/.
236
Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 141 (“What matters for judicial review is the
actual functions and activities involved, rather than the nomenclature adopted
by the health care facility.”).
237
Flanagan, supra note 40, at 576 (“[T]he use of the conclusions of
such reviews in litigation renders the peer reviewers involuntary experts for
one of the parties.”); see also Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D.
249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970) (“[C]onstructive professional criticism cannot occur
in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor’s suggestion will be used as
a denunciation of a colleague’s conduct in a malpractice suit.”).
238
FED. R. EVID. 407 (“Subsequent Remedial Measures”) provides:
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or
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The New Jersey version of this rule provides that
“[e]vidence of remedial measures taken after an event is not
admissible to prove that the event was caused by negligence or
culpable conduct.”239 The rationale for this rule “rests on a
social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety.”240 Courts and commentators have recognized the
parallels between the self-critical analysis privilege and the
subsequent remedial measures doctrine.241 For example, one
court recognized that both rules protect parties from the
Hobson’s choice of aggressively investigating accidents
. . . , ascertaining the causes and results, and correcting
the violations or dangerous conditions, but thereby
creating a self-incriminating record that may be evidence
of liability, or deliberately avoiding making a record on
the subject (and possibly leaving the public exposed to
242
danger) in order to lessen the risk of civil liability.

harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a
product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction. But the
court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as
impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the
feasibility of precautionary measures.
239
N.J. R. EVID. 407.
240
FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note. As Baron Bramwell
described it over a century ago, this rule rejects the idea that “because the
world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.” Hart v.
Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L. Times Rep. (n.s.) 261, 263 (Eng. 1869).
241
See, e.g., Making Sense of Rules of Privilege, supra note 46, at 1351–
55 (advocating that federal courts evaluate self-critical analysis claims
utilizing the “activity-privilege” inquiry of Rule 407 rather than the broader
“relational” privilege rules under Rule 501); see also Reid v. Lockheed
Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 384 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 2001);
Capallupo v. FMC Corp., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193 (D. Minn.
1988) (noting that a defendant’s claim of self-critical analysis “is perhaps
most closely related to the philosophy of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence”).
242
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 524 (N.D.
Fla. 1994).
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Even in the oft-cited Dowling case, the court recognized that
“the difference between pre-accident safety reviews and postaccident investigations is an important one.”243
To be clear, Rule 407 governs questions of admissibility—it
is not a privilege—and therefore evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is still discoverable.244 Consequently, the
preparer or creator of documents attesting to subsequent
remedies should not have any reasonable expectation that the
documents will remain confidential. Still, allowing for the
discovery, but not the admissibility, of patient safety and peer
review documents is worth consideration, particularly in New
Jersey. First, the state’s Patient Bill of Rights empowers patients
with a “right to know” about the treatment they received.245 But
on an even more basic level—and as the Christy court put it—
“the search for truth is paramount in the litigation process.”246 A
patient safety protection structured around Rule 407, rather than
an absolute privilege, could strike the right balance between an
injured patient’s right to information and the hospital’s
confidence that its own safety procedures will not expose them
to liability.
The PSA deviated from this “right to know” principle.
While it mandated facilities to inform patients of any adverse
events, it simultaneously shielded important documents
concerning these events. Proponents would argue that this rule is
vital: in certain circumstances, overall improvements in patient
safety rely upon the knowledge that certain materials will remain
inaccessible to an individual patient. The argument is sensible,

243

Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992).
See 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5291 (2012) (“Rule 407 is a rule of
admissibility, not a privilege; hence, subsequent remedial measures are
discoverable.”); see also Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., The Privilege of SelfCritical Analysis: A Survey of the Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 189 (“Rule
407 is not a privilege rule.”).
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See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(c) (West 2007). The interplay
between this statute and the PSA, in this author’s opinion, is ripe for
litigation and worth further judicial exploration.
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Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004).
244

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

628

but, in this author’s opinion, contrary to goals of patient safety.
If patients have a right to know every detail of their treatment,
shouldn’t they also have a right to know what occurred following
their treatment?
Consider the case of Esther and Gedalia Applegrad, who,
aside from their “search for truth” as litigants simply seek
answers as a mother and father as to why their child’s delivery
could have gone so horribly wrong.247 Did the hospital evaluate
the incident, and if so, how rigorously? Did it determine how
the incident occurred? Was a particular medical staff member to
blame for the incident, and if so, was the person sanctioned?
Was he or she involved in prior adverse incidents? Did the staff
member apologize or concede fault? And most importantly, what
procedures has the facility instituted or considered instituting to
ensure that similar errors do not occur in the future? Clearly,
such evidence should be inadmissible at trial. Still, an injured
patient deserves to have these questions answered—at least as a
way to provide a measure of emotional closure and mental
clarity. Rule 407, which would deem patient safety documents
discoverable, yet inadmissible, seems to strike a fair and
reasonable balance.
To conclude, it is worth returning to one of the Harvard
Note’s final thoughts:
A court applying the privilege of self-critical analysis
should also remember that syllogistic application
embodies the policy choice of the institution that decided
to adopt the privilege. In adopting the privilege, a
determination was made that the public interest weighed
in favor of confidentiality. Whether this decision was
made by a higher court, the same court at an earlier
time, or a legislature, judges should give due weight to

247

See Mary Pat Gallagher, Patient Safety Act Privilege Held Permeable
in Malpractice Suit, N.J.L.J., Aug. 13, 2012, at 4 (“The Applegrads’
lawyer, Cynthia Walters . . . says there was almost no contemporaneous
record of what happened during the crucial 20-minute delay in resuscitating
the baby or what happened with the intubation.”).
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the binding effect of a prior determination that the
privilege furthers the public interest.248
The New Jersey Legislature, in passing the PSA, made clear
its binding public policy determination that materials of selfcritical analysis remain confidential. Courts will do their best to
elucidate this mandate. Whether the PSA’s “syllogistic
application” of the privilege will actually promote the principal
goal of the Act—to improve overall patient safety—remains to be
seen.

248

The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1099
(emphasis added).

